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Abstract
This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumer-
ating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted
games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class as well.
Second, we focus on the special case of bipartite complete games with minimum, and
we compare and rank these games according to the behavior of some ecient power in-
dices of players of type 1 (or of type 2). The main result of this second part establishes
all allowable rankings of these games when the Shapley-Shubik power index is used on
players of type 1.
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1 Introduction
The study of voting systems can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when
Dedekind studied monotonic Boolean functions. In the context of voting systems these
functions correspond to simple games. In their seminal book, von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [34] came up with the denition of a simple game as a type of cooperative game where
the payos to coalitions are either 1 or 0, i.e., coalitions can be considered either winning
or losing.
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A particular case of simple games, and possibly the most important subcase, is that of
weighted games, in which weights are assigned to players and a threshold is set so that a
coalition is winning if and only if the sum of weights of its players is at least the threshold.
This is natural in Parliaments and also in corporate voting when dierent shareholders may
own dierent numbers of shares. Two natural extensions of weighted games have also been
thoroughly studied: (1) complete games and (2) simple games with small dimension. In this
paper we deal with a particular class of complete games, the so called \complete games with
minimum" (see, e.g., [17] and [18]).
It turns out that every complete game with ve or fewer players is weighted, so the small-
est possible illustrations of complete non-weighted games occur for six players: y1; y2; b1; b2; b3;
and b4 (here y means players of yellow type, whereas b means players of blue type), and we
declare that a coalition is winning if and only if it contains: at least three players and at
least one of them is yellow. Intuitively, it is clear that all the yellow players have the same
inuence (according to the desirability relation), and all the blue players have the same
inuence, but the yellow players have more inuence than the blue players {suggesting a
complete (weak) ordering for the players in this example of a voting system. In terms of the
language we introduce later (in Section 2) this simple game is complete but not weighted.
Note that e.g., the coalitions of type fy1; y2; big for i = 1; 2; 3; 4 are minimal winning
since all players contained are essential for the coalition to be winning. The same occurs
for the coalitions fyi; bj ; bkg for i = 1; 2 and 1  j < k  4. However, this latter set
of coalitions has an additional singularity: none of the players in these coalitions can be
replaced by a weaker player. E.g., we cannot replace in these coalitions the yellow player
for a blue player since the new coalition obtained would not be winning. In terms of the
language we introduce later (in Section 2) we say that the coalitions of type fyi; bj ; bkg for
i = 1; 2 and 1  j < k  4 are shift-minimal winning coalitions. On the contrary, if in a
shift-minimal winning coalition we replace a weaker player by a stronger one we obtain a
minimal, but not shift-minimal, winning coalition. Finally, observe that all shift-minimal
winning coalitions have the same number of players of each color, i.e., they all contain one
yellow player and two blue players and this information can be encapsulated in the vector:
(1,2) where the rst component represents the number of yellow players and the second
the number of blue players. Then, we refer to the game as being complete with only one
type of shift-minimal winning coalitions, or equivalently, a complete game with minimum as
was denominated in [17] and [18]. Note that in the previous example there is a bipartition
between types of players: yellow players and blue players. Hence, the example introduced
is a bipartite complete game with minimum.
The rst part of the paper deals with enumerations for weighted games with minimum,
while the second part deals with rankings of players for power indices in bipartite complete
games with minimum. The dimension of complete games with minimum is studied in [18].
For instance, the previous example has dimension 2 and, therefore, it decomposes as the
intersection of two weighted games: [5; 3; 3; 1; 1; 1; 1] \ [3; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1] (the notation for a
representation of a weighted game is introduced in the preliminaries section). Most existing
voting systems have a small dimension. E.g., the current voting system of the European
Council is an example of a complete game with dimension 3, i.e., it decomposes as an
intersection of three weighted games which cannot be simplied to an intersection of fewer
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weighted games [12].
The voting system to amend the Canadian Constitution is an example of a non-weighted
game which meets both requirements: it is complete (and has only one type of shift-minimal
winning coalitions) and has dimension 2, i.e., it decomposes as the intersection of two
weighted games. Since 1982, an amendment to the Canadian Constitution can become
law only if it is approved by at least seven of the ten Canadian provinces, subject to the pro-
viso that the approving provinces have, among them, at least half of Canada's population.
It was rst studied in Kilgour [23]. A census (in percentages) taken from 1960 for the Cana-
dian provinces was: Prince Edward Island (1%), Newfoundland (3%), New Brunswick (3%),
Nova Scotia (4%), Manitoba (5%), Saskatchewan (5%), Alberta (7%), British Columbia
(9%), Quebec (29%) and Ontario (34%). This is another example of a bipartite complete
game with minimum and the vector representing all shift-minimal winning coalitions is: (1,6)
where the rst component indicates that exactly one of the two most populated provinces
votes in favor of the voted law and 6-out-of-8 of the other provinces vote in favor of the
voted law as well. Games of this type are the object of study in this paper.
This paper primarily concerns enumerations. The number of complete games is known
up to nine players only [14], and the number of weighted games is also known up to nine
players [26]. A seminal result on enumeration formulas for weighted games and complete
games is May's theorem [31], and many other results have followed, e.g., the enumeration of
weighted games with up to six players dates back at least to 1962 [33].
The mathematical structure of complete games was studied in detail in the nineties
by several scholars, e.g., in [25] and [4]. In the latter work a system of quantities (called
characteristic invariants) is associated with every complete game and their basic properties
are stated. It is shown that these quantities determine the game (uniqueness) and that every
such system is associated with some complete game (existence).
According to this classication the simplest case arises when the matrix (one of the
two components of the characteristic invariants) has only one shift-minimal winning vector
(which corresponds therefore to a set of closely related shift-minimal winning coalitions that
are enough to generate the complete game). These games have been studied in [11] and [17].
The rst paper provides necessary and sucient conditions to determine whether a game
of this type is weighted. In the second paper the characteristic invariants are used to ease
the calculus of dierent types of solutions of the game like the nucleolus, the kernel and
semivalues.
The interest for this type of structures has also emerged in the eld of Cryptography. The
access structure in a secret sharing scheme (see e.g., [40]) can also be modeled by a simple
game. To this end Simmons [39] introduced the concept of a hierarchical access structure.
Such an access structure stipulates that agents are partitioned into m levels, and a sequence
of thresholds k1 < k2 <    < km is set, so that a coalition is authorized if and only if it has
k1 agents of the rst level and k2 agents of the rst two levels and k3 agents of the rst three
levels etc. These hierarchical structures are called conjunctive since all the m conditions
must be satised for a coalition to be authorized. If only one of the m conditions must be
satised for a coalition to be authorized, then the structure is called disjunctive. A typical
example of a conjunctive hierarchical game would be the United Nations Security Council,
where for the passage of a resolution all ve permanent members must vote for it and also
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at least nine members in total. The ideality of disjunctive games was proved by Brickell [3],
while the ideality of conjunctive games was proved by Tassa [42]. Ideality means they can
carry the most informationally ecient secret sharing scheme and be completely secure (i.e.,
not giving any information about the secret to unauthorized coalitions). Gvozdeva et al. [19]
relate these two types of structures with complete games with one shift-minimal winning
vector and with complete games with one-shift maximal losing vector.
In this paper we use game theoretic methods and terminology, and we talk about com-
plete games with minimum or, equivalently, complete games with a unique shift-minimal
winning vector (instead of hierarchical conjunctive structures) and games with a unique
shift-maximal losing vector (instead of hierarchical disjunctive structures).
Here we enumerate weighted games with minimum. We nd a polynomial formula as a
function of the number of players of the game. This complements the corresponding known
result for the enumeration of complete games of this type [17].
As for the second contribution, we recall that the distribution of power in some im-
portant real-world institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the voting system of the
World Bank, the United Nations Security Council, the procedure to amend the Canadian
Constitution, etc.) has been extensively studied, e.g., in [28], [29], [1], [43], [10], [41] and [23]
to cite just some references.
We consider here the set of bipartite complete games with minimum, i.e., complete games
with two types of equivalent players and one shift-minimal winning vector, and discuss the
possible rankings of these games given by the Shapley-Shubik power index for a player of
type 1. The main result of this part establishes all the allowable rankings for the power of
players of a given type in bipartite complete games with minimum for which the number of
players of each type is xed. We do remark that many papers in the literature have been
devoted to study whether two or more power indices provide the same rankings in each game
(see e.g., [8], [5], [13]). However, as far as we know, very little has been done on comparing
power of players in dierent games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic concepts and de-
nitions of simple games, revise the terminology of the characteristic invariants for complete
games and recall the known enumerations for complete games and for weighted games. In
Section 3 we obtain a formula for the number of weighted games with one shift-minimal
winning vector and deduce some consequences. In Section 4 we do a comparison of power
for dierent complete games with two types of equivalent players and one shift-minimal win-
ning vector. We prove that a limited number of rankings are possible for the Shapley-Shubik
power index and we formulate a similar conjecture for the relative Banzhaf index. A study
of duality in Section 5 permits us to extend the results obtained in the two previous sections
to complete games with one shift-maximal losing vector. Some hints for future research are
given in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
This preliminary section is organized into ve subsections. The rst two refer to simple
games in general and complete games in particular. The remaining three recall a result
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on the structure of complete games that will be essential for our purposes, previous results
found in the literature on enumerations of games, and some power indices.
2.1 Simple games
A (monotonic) simple game is a pair (N;W) where N = f1; 2; :::; ng and W is a collection
of subsets of N such that:
i) ; =2 W,
ii) N 2 W,
iii) if S 2 W and S  T , then T 2 W.
From now on we will omit the term monotonic. Simple games can be viewed as models
of voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted
against the status quo. The set N is called the grand coalition, its members are called players
and its subsets coalitions, and the subsets in W are called winning coalitions. The intuition
here is that a set S is a winning coalition if and only if the bill or amendment passes when
the players in S are precisely the ones who vote for it. A subset of N that is not in W
is called a losing coalition and the collection of losing coalitions is denoted by L: If each
proper subcoalition of a winning coalition is losing, this winning coalition is called minimal.
The set of minimal winning coalitions is denoted by Wm. It should be noted that a simple
game is completely determined by its minimal winning coalitions. If each proper coalition
containing a losing coalition is winning, this losing coalition is called maximal. The set of
maximal losing coalitions is denoted by LM and it also determines the game.
Let (N;W) be a simple game. The dual game of (N;W) is the game (N;W) where
W = fS  N : N n S =2 Wg.
A player i has veto in a simple game (N;W) if S 2 W implies i 2 S. A player i 2 N is
called a null player in (N;W) if i =2 S for every S 2 Wm: A player i 2 N is a dictator if and
only if Wm = ffigg; in which case the remaining players in N become null players. Note
that a dictator is the most extreme form of having veto.
A simple game (N;W) is a weighted game if it admits a representation by means of n
non-negative real numbers w1; : : : ; wn and a positive real number q such that S 2 W if and
only if w(S)  q; where w(S) = P
i2S
wi for each coalition S  N . The number q is called
the quota of the game and wi the weight of player i: From now [q;w1; :::; wn] will mean
the representation of (N;W) by means of weights w1; : : : ; wn and quota q. The weighted
representation (whenever it exists) is never unique. For instance, [c  q; c  w1; : : : ; c  wn] is
also a representation of (N;W) for all c > 0.
Two simple games (N;W) and (N 0;W 0) are said to be isomorphic if there exists a
bijective map f : N ! N 0 such that S 2 W if and only if f(S) 2 W 0:
Let (N;W) be a simple game. Set Wi = fS 2 W : i 2 Sg and let ij : N ! N denote
the transposition of players i; j 2 N (i.e., ij(i) = j; ij(j) = i and ij(k) = k for k 6= i; j).
The individual desirability relation, introduced by Isbell (see [21] as well as [22]) and later
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generalized by Maschler and Peleg [30], is the binary relation % on N :
i % j if and only if ij(Wj)  Wi;
meaning that i is at least as desirable as j as a coalition partner. It is easy to see that %
is a preorder (i.e., a reexive and transitive relation), we abbreviate i % j, j % i by i  j
and say that i and j are equi-desirable players ( is an equivalence relation in N), and we
abbreviate i % j, j %= i by i  j and say that i is strictly more desirable than j as a coalition
partner.
The relation % induces an ordering  in the set of -classes N= = fN1; :::; Ntg: Thus,
Np  Nq if and only if i % j for any i 2 Np and any j 2 Nq:
2.2 Complete games
The desirability is not always complete (total). Then, if any two players are comparable by
%, (N;W) is said to be a complete game;1 in this case, the {classes are linearly ordered
by  . We say that a complete game has trivial classes if it possesses either veto or null
players. Notice that each weighted game is complete because wi  wj implies i % j:
A coalition S 2 W is shift-minimal winning if (S nfig)[fjg =2 W for all i 2 S and j =2 S
with i  j. Note that a winning coalition can be minimal without being shift-minimal.
Example 2.1 Let (N;W) be the simple game dened by N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g; and Wm =
fS  N : jSj = 3; S 6= f3; 4; 5gg. It is easy to check that N decomposes into a bipartition
of equivalent players N1 = f1; 2g and N2 = f3; 4; 5g, and i  j for all i 2 N1 and j 2 N2.
Coalitions f1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4g; f1; 2; 5g are minimal winning but not shift-minimal winning in
(N;W). The remaining six winning coalitions of cardinality 3 are shift-minimal winning.
From now on we only deal with complete games and without loss of generality we assume
1 % 2 %    % n in the following. We can partition the whole setN of players into equivalence
classes N1; : : : ; Nt and say that the complete game consists of t types of (weakly) ordered
players. By ni we denote the cardinality of the set Ni for 1  i  t. Coalitions are
categorized into dierent types, which can be described by a vector (m1; : : : ;mt) meaning
mi-out-of-ni players (from the set Ni) for 1  i  t.
Let us consider Example 2.1 with n1 = 2 and n2 = 3. Due to the assumed ordering of
the players we have N1 = f1; 2g and N2 = f3; 4; 5g and i  j for all i = 1; 2 and j = 3; 4; 5
so that we can write N1 > N2. With this, the vector (1; 2) is the type of coalitions f1; 3; 4g,
f1; 3; 5g, f1; 4; 5g, f2; 3; 4g, f2; 3; 5g and f2; 4; 5g. Since we have 1  2 and 3  4  5
either all these six coalitions are winning or they are all losing and we can therefore speak
of a winning or a losing vector. In Example 2.1 (1; 2) is a (shift-minimal) winning vector.
Let (N;W) be a simple game and Nh be the classes of equally desirable players for
1  h  t. We call a vector em := (m1; : : : ;mt), where 0  mh  jNhj for 1  h  t,
a winning vector if S 2 W, where S is an arbitrary coalition of N containing exactly mh
elements of Nh for 1  h  t. Analogously, we call such a vector a losing vector if S 2 L,
where S is an arbitrary coalition of N containing exactly mh elements of Nh for 1  h  t.
1Complete games are also known in the literature of simple games as linear games or directed games.
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Following [4], several concepts of ordering among vectors (i.e., types of coalitions) in N0t
(where N0 = N [ f0g) have to be considered. For two vectors ea = (a1; : : : ; at) 2 N0t andeb = (b1; : : : ; bt) 2 N0t, representing types of coalitions in a complete simple game, we write
(the standard componentwise order between vectors) ea  eb if and only if we have ai  bi
for all i = 1; : : : ; t. We use ea > eb if ea  eb and ea 6= eb. We write ea  eb if and only if we have
kP
i=1
ai 
kP
i=1
bi for all 1  k  t. For ea  eb and ea 6= eb we use ea  eb as an abbreviation and
say that they are comparable vectors with vector eb being smaller than vector ea. If neitherea  eb nor eb  ea holds, we write ea ./ eb and say that vector ea and vector eb are incomparable.
As (1; 2) is a winning vector in Example 2.1, so are (1; 3), (2; 2) and (2; 3) because of the
monotonicity property required in the denition of simple game, but also is (2; 1) because
Example 2.1 is a complete game. From (1; 2) nothing can be deduced about the vectors
(1; 1), (0; 3), (0; 2), (1; 0) and (0; 1). However, we can check that all the coalitions associated
with these vectors are losing for Example 2.1.
A vector em = (m1; : : : ;mt) in a complete game with t types of equivalent players (N;W)
is a minimal winning vector if em is a winning vector and every vector em0 with em0 < em is
losing. Analogously, a vector em is a maximal losing vector if em is a losing vector and every
vector em0 with em0 > em is winning. Of course, a vector is shift-minimal winning (resp.,
shift-maximal losing) if and only if any coalition represented by the vector is shift-minimal
winning (resp., shift-maximal losing).
Similarly, a shift-minimal winning vector2 em is a winning vector such that every vectorem0 with em0  em is losing. Analogously, a vector em is a shift-maximal losing vector if em is
a losing vector and every vector em0 with em0  em is winning.
We denote byWm,W sm, LM and LsM the sets of minimal winning vectors, shift-minimal
winning vectors, maximal losing vectors and shift-maximal losing vectors, respectively. In
Example 2.1 we have:
Wm = f(2; 1); (1; 2)g;
W sm = f(1; 2)g;
LM = f(2; 0); (1; 1); (0; 3)g;
LsM = f(2; 0); (0; 3)g:
The Hasse diagram for the ordering of vectors in complete games with the given hierarchyen = (2; 3) is shown in Figure 1.
2.3 A parameterization theorem for complete games
Carreras and Freixas have given a full parameterization of complete games, up to isomor-
phisms, in [4] using vectors as models of coalitions and the partial order . We denote the
(decreasing) lexicographic order by m, i.e., we have (a1; : : : ; an)m (b1; : : : ; bn) if there is an
index 1  h  n with ai = bi for all 1  i < h and ah > bh. An example is given by
(1; 2; 1)m (1; 1; 3).
2In [4] they are called -minimal winning vectors.
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Figure 1: The Hasse diagram for the ordering  of vectors on en = (2; 3).
Theorem 2.2
(a) Assume that a vector en = (n1; n2; : : : ; nt) with natural coecients and a matrix
M =
0BBB@
m1;1 m1;2 : : : m1;t
m2;1 m2;2 : : : m2;t
...
...
. . .
...
mr;1 mr;2 : : : mr;t
1CCCA =
0BBB@
em1em2
...emr
1CCCA
with natural or null coecients are given, satisfying the following properties:
(i) m1;1 > 0 and 0  mi;j  nj, mi;j 2 N0 for 1  i  r and 1  j  t,
(ii) emi ./ emj for all 1  i < j  r,
(iii) for each 1  j < t there is at least one row-index i such that mi;j > 0, mi;j+1 <
nj+1, and
(iv) emi m emi+1 for 1  i < r.
Then, there exists a unique complete game (N;W) with invariants (en;M), i.e., withen as a vector of the cardinalities of the equivalence classes and matrix M where their
rows consist of the shift-minimal winning vectors.
(b) Two complete games (N1;W1) and (N2;W2) are isomorphic if and only if en1 = en2
and M1 =M2.
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As a consequence of this theorem, any complete game can be denoted as (en;M), the
pair of characteristic invariants of the game.
In such a vector/matrix representation (characteristic invariants) of a complete game the
number of players n is determined by n =
tP
i=1
ni. Although Theorem 2.2 looks technical at
rst glance, the necessity of the required properties is easily explained. Obviously, nj  1
and 0  mi;j  nj must hold for 1  i  r, 1  j  t. If emi  emj or emi  emj then we haveemi = emj or either emi or emj cannot be a shift-minimal winning vector. If for a column-index
1  j < t we have mi;j = 0 or mi;j+1 = nj+1 for all 1  i  r, then we can check whether we
have g  h for all g 2 Nj , h 2 Nj+1, which is a contradiction to the denition of the classes
Nj and therefore also for the numbers nj . Obviously a complete game does not change if
two rows of the matrix M are interchanged. Thus we require a given ordering of the rows
to avoid repetitions: m stands for the lexicographic ordering of vectors in N0t.
As the desirability relation is total in complete games, it denes for these games a weak
ordering on the set of players. For example, writing that a ve-player complete game has
hierarchy 1 > 2 = 3 = 4 > 5 means that there is one player which has the maximum
inuence, another one that has the minimum inuence and the other three have all the
same intermediate inuence, in that case we can represent the previous ordering as the
vector (1; 3; 1). We say that two complete games have the same hierarchy if the ordering
that denes the desirability relation on them is the same. Thus, if (en1;M1) and (en2;M2)
are the characteristic invariants of two complete games, they have the same hierarchy ifen1 = en2.
The Hasse diagram for the ordering  of vectors in complete games with the given
hierarchy en = (2; 2) is shown in next Figure 2.
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0 0

 
0 1

 
1 0
  
0 2

 
1 1

 
2 0
  
1 2

 
2 1

 
2 2

6
QQk 3
3 QQk
QQk 3
3 QQk
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Figure 2: The Hasse diagram for the ordering  of vectors on en = (2; 2).
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We would like to remark that for t = 1 only r = 1 is possible and the requirements in
Theorem 2.2 reduce to 1  m1;1  n1 = n. Also for t = 2 one can easily give a more compact
formulation for the requirements in Theorem 2.2. A complete description of the possible
values n1; n2;m1;1;m1;2 corresponding to a complete game with parameters n, t = 2, and
r = 1 is given by
1  n1  n  1;
n1 + n2 = n;
1  m1;1  n1;
0  m1;2  n2   1:
Two important real-world examples of voting weighted games with only one shift-minimal
winning vector are (see chapter 8 in [43] for more details on these two examples): the United
Nations Security Council {without taking abstention into consideration{ and the procedure
to amend the Canadian Constitution. These examples have (en;M) = ((5; 10); (5; 4)) and
(en;M) = ((2; 8); (1; 6)) as respective characteristic invariants.
2.4 Known enumerations for weighted games and for complete games
Let wg(n; t; r) be the number of weighted games with n players, t equivalence classes
N1; : : : ; Nt and r shift-minimal winning vectors. Let wg(n; ; r)3 be the number of weighted
games with n players and r shift-minimal winning vectors (independently of the number
of equivalence classes, t). Let wg(n; t; ) be the number of weighted games with n players,
and t equivalence classes N1; : : : ; Nt (independently of the number of shift-minimal winning
vectors, r). We identify wg(n; ; ), i.e., the number of weighted games with n players in-
dependently of the values of r and t, with simply wg(n). Analogous notations cg(n; t; r),
cg(n; ; r), cg(n; t; ) and cg(n) will be used for the respective enumerations of complete
games.
The rst exact counting can at least be traced back to May [31] which establishes the
number of symmetric or anonymous simple games. Any such game with n players admits a
weighted representation [q; 1; 1; : : : ; 1| {z }
n
] where q 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
Let wgsym(n), cgsym(n) and sgsym(n) be respectively the number of symmetric: weighted
games, complete games and, simple games with n players.
Theorem 2.3 wg(n; 1; 1) = cg(n; 1; 1) = n = wgsym(n) = cgsym(n) = sgsym(n)
The number of complete games with one shift-minimal winning vector was determined
in [17], and a more rened result appears in [18] (parts 1 and 2 of the next result respectively).
Theorem 2.4 1. cg(n; ; 1) = 2n   1,
3More precisely, the notation wg(n; ; r) stands for
nP
t=1
wg(n; t; r).
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2.
cg(n; t; 1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
n; if t = 1 
n+1
2t 1

; if 2  t  n2 + 1
0; otherwise
Other formulas have been obtained quite recently. In [16] we can nd the next enu-
meration, where F (n) are the Fibonacci numbers, which constitute a well{known sequence
of integer numbers dened by the following recurrence relation: F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and
F (n) = F (n  1) + F (n  2) for all n > 1.
Theorem 2.5 cg(n; 2; ) = F (n+ 6)  (n2 + 4n+ 8):
Let us nally remark that a formula for cg(n; ; 2) is found in [27].
Theorem 2.6
cg(n; ; 2) =
nX
t=1
cg(n;t;2) = 2  (4n+2n)

6 8n 4n
2 3
n(n 3)

2n 5
n 4

+
2n2+3n 2
(n+1)(n 2)

2n 3
n 3

:
In [27] it is proved that cg(n; t; r) is a quasi-polynomial in n, if t and r are given,
and can therefore be automatically computed (without escaping of the problem of capacity
limitations). The main purpose of Section 3 is to determine wg(n; ; 1) as well as to obtain
other related ner results.
2.5 Power indices
Informally a power index is a numerical measure that estimates the a priori capacity or
inuence of each player in a simple game. Of course the notion of power is complex and
has been analyzed in depth by several authors. An interesting reference is the book by
Morriss [32], which analyzes power from a philosophical point of view.
Two prominent power indices are more recognized and used than others, and both known
power indices, and both of them are based on the notion of a swing. A coalition S is a swing
for i 2 S if and only if S 2 W but S n fig =2 W. Let ci(N;W) denote the number of swings
of player i in game (N;W). Then the relative Banzhaf index [2] is dened as
Bzi(N;W) = ci(N;W)P
j2N
cj(N;W)
while the absolute Banzhaf index [35] is dened as
Bz0i(N;W) =
ci(N;W)
2n 1
:
The Shapley-Shubik index [38], which is the restriction of the well-known Shapley value [37]
for cooperative games, can be expressed as a function of the swings as follows. Let s be the
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cardinality of the swing S for i and csi (N;W) be the number of swings for i for coalitions S
of cardinality s. Then,
SSi(N;W) =
nX
s=1
(s  1)!(n  s)!
n!
csi (N;W):
This less usual formulation of the Shapley-Shubik index will be helpful here for our purposes.
The Shapley-Shubik index of a player can be viewed as his/her expected part of a xed total
prize, i.e., the power of a player is meant to be the player's expected payo. Dubey and
Shapley [9] proved the following result.
Proposition 2.7 If (N;W) is any simple game then, for all i 2 N , we have
(a) SSi(N;W) = SSi(N;W).
(b) Bzi(N;W) = Bzi(N;W) and Bz0i(N;W) = Bz0i(N;W).
The fact that csi (N;W) = csi (N;W) for all s = 1; 2; : : : ; n justies (a) and implies that
ci(N;W) = ci(N;W), which justies (b), a property discovered by Dubey and Shapley [9].
3 Counting weighted games with minimum
If we consider a subgame of a weighted game when this game is stripped of its null and
veto players, then the original game is weighted if and only if the subgame is weighted and,
similarly, the original game is complete if and only if the subgame is complete, see e.g., [44].
Let (en;M) be a complete game with t equivalence classes. By (en;M)# we denote0B@ ns; : : : ; ne ;
0B@m1;s : : : m1;e... . . . ...
mr;s : : : mr;e
1CA
1CA ;
where s = 1 if there are no veto players, s = 2 if there are veto players (which would form
the strongest class), e = t if there are no null players, and e = t  1 if there are null players
(which would form the weakest class). If all players of (en;M) have veto or are null players
(en;M)# is empty.
For instance, (en;M)# does not change for the system to amend the Canadian Constitu-
tion, i.e., (en;M)#= (en;M) = ((2; 8); (1 6)), whereas (en;M)# reduces to ((10); (4)) for the
United Nations Security Council, because the ve permanent members have veto right.
Lemma 3.1 Let cwg(n; t; r) be the number of non-trivial weighted games with t equivalence
classes N1; : : : ; Nt and r shift-minimal winning vectors. For r > 1 or t > 2 we have
wg(n; t; r) = cwg(n; t; r) + n 1X
h=1
2  cwg(n  h; t  1; r) + (h  1)  cwg(n  h; t  2; r); (1)
where we dene cwg(n; t; r) = 0 for the non-feasible cases n < t or t < 1. For r = 1 and
t = 1 an additional 1 has to be added to the right hand side of Equation (1), and for r = 1
and t = 2 an additional term n  1 has to be added to the right hand side of Equation (1).
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Proof. Every weighted game arises from a non-trivial weighted game or an empty game
by appending h1  0 veto players and h2  0 null players. 
For r = 1 and arbitrary t the set of maximal losing vectors of complete games without
null players, i.e., with m1;t  1, was analytically given in [18] (see next lemma). As for r = 1
the rst indices in vector em1 do not carry any information we omit them.
Lemma 3.2 For a complete game  
n1; : : : ; nt

;
 
m1 : : :mt

without null players, i.e., with mt  1, the complete set of shift-maximal losing vectors is
given in the following matrix:0BBBBBBB@
a1;1 n2 n3 : : : nt
a2;1 a2;2 n3 : : : nt
a3;1 a3;2 a3;3 : : : nt
...
...
...
. . .
...
at 1;1 at 1;2 at 1;3 : : : nt
at;1 at;2 at;3 : : : at;t
1CCCCCCCA
=:
0B@ea1...eat
1CA ;
where
ai;j := max
(
0;min
(
nj ;  1 +
iX
h=1
mh  
j 1X
h=1
nh
))
for 1  j  i  t.
Note that each vector eai for 1  i  t represents shift-maximal losing coalitions. Indeed,
these coalitions contain
Pi
j=1mj 1 strongest players (according to the desirability relation)
and additionally they also contain the
Pt
j=i+1 nj weakest players, i.e., those players that
belong to the t   i weakest equivalence classes, from the i + 1th class to the tth last class.
If in one of these coalitions an additional player was added or a weaker player was replaced
by a stronger one, then the new vector eb representing the coalition would contain at leastPi
j=1mj players for each 1  i  t and therefore would be winning.
The conditions (i){(iv) of Theorem 2.2-(a) reduce to 1  m1  n1, 0  mt  nt  1, and
1  mh  nh  1 for all h such that 2  h  t  1. We remark that if a complete game with
r = 1 has null players, then the complete set of shift-maximal losing vectors is given by the
vectors in Lemma 3.2 except for the last vector eat. We would like to remark too that eat is
a losing vector which is not maximal and that there is a typo in the remark of [18], i.e., the
rst row (instead of the last one) must be deleted.
Having an analytic description of the shift-maximal losing vectors at hand it is not too
hard to characterize the set of weighted games analytically. Indeed, already in [11] the
non-trivial weighted games with r = 1, i.e., those having exactly one shift-minimal winning
vector, were completely classied.
Theorem 3.3 A non-trivial complete game (en;M) with r = 1 is a weighted game if and
only if either t = 1 or t = 2 and m2 2 f1; n2   1g.
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Proof. Due to Theorem 2.2 we can assume t  2. For t = 2 the shift-maximal losing
vectors are given by
(m1   1; n2) and (m1 + c;m2   1  c);
where c = min (n1  m1;m2   1). Choosing w1 = 1 we conclude
m1 + w2m2 > m1   1 + w2n2;
m1 + w2m2 > m1 + c+ w2 (m2   1  c) ;
which is equivalent to w2 <
1
n2 m2 and (1 + c)w2 > c. If m2 = n2   1 or c = 0, which is
equivalent to m2 = 1, there exists a solution for w2. If m2  n2   2 and c  1 the two
inequalities are contradicting.
Now we consider the remaining cases t  3. Here the vectors
(m1   1; n2; : : : ; nt); and (m1 + 1;m2   1;m3   1; n4; : : : ; nt)
are losing vectors (the second not necessarily shift-maximal). Thus for w1 = 1 we have
m1 +
tX
j=2
wjmj > m1   1 +
tX
j=2
wjnj ;
m1 +
tX
j=2
wjmj > m1 + 1 + w2(m2   1) + w3(m3   1) +
tX
j=4
wjnj ;
from which we conclude 1 > w2 + w3 and w2 + w3 > 1, which is a contradiction. 
Thus together with Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 2.3 we can conclude:
Theorem 3.4 For n  1 we have
fwg(n; 1; 1) = n  1;
fwg(n; 2; 1) =  0 if n  2;
n2   6n+ 9 if n  3;fwg(n; t; 1) = 0 if t  3;
wg(n; 1; 1) = n;
wg(n; 2; 1) =

n  1 if n  2;
2(n  2)2 + 2 if n  3;
wg(n; 3; 1) =

0 if n  3;
5n3 48n2+157n 174
6 if n  4;
wg(n; 4; 1) =

0 if n  5;
n4 16n3+95n2 248n+240
12 if n  6;
wg(n; t; 1) = 0 if t  5:
Adding up the previous enumerations we get the following compact expression for the
total number of weighted games with a unique shift-minimal winning vector.
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Corollary 3.5
wg(n; ; 1) =
8<: 2
n   1 if n  5
n4   6n3 + 23n2   18n+ 12
12
if n  6
Thus, the numbers of weighted games wg(n; ; 1) and complete games cg(n; ; 1) (see The-
orem 2.4) coincide for n  5 players, but their ratio converges to zero as n increases. An
asymptotic upper bound for weighted games is given in [7] and an asymptotic lower bound
for complete games is given in [36], where these games are called regular Boolean functions.
Many useful and accurate asymptotic estimations for simple games and subclasses of them
are provided in [24].
4 Analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games
with minimum
Many papers have been devoted to study classes of games for which two or more power indices
provide the same rankings in every game of such classes, see e.g., [8], [5], [13]. However, as
far as we know, very little has been studied about comparisons of dierent games depending
on how a given power index acts on them.
In this section we will consider complete games with two types of equivalent players and
with only one shift-minimal winning vector. For these games we will give explicit formulas
to calculate some ecient power indices. Since the games have only two types of equivalent
players and the considered power indices are ecient, it will be possible to totally rank these
games according to the behavior of the power index on players that belong to a xed class.
Of course, the order obtained considering the power over a type of players for bipartite
complete games with games with minimum is reversed if the power index is evaluated over
players that belong to the other equivalence class.
An important tool to this purpose is monotonicity in Young's sense [45] which was used
to give a characterization of the Shapley value that avoids additivity. If we assume a xed
set of players N we write W BiW 0 whenever if S is a swing for i in W 0 then S is a swing
for i in W. Relation Bi allows us to qualitatively compare the position of a given player i
in two games. However, we do not see a direct application of such a monotonicity for most
of the cases we are going to study.
4.1 Allowable rankings for the Shapley-Shubik index
The main purpose of this subsection is to study the allowable hierarchies that the Shapley-
Shubik index produces when applied to dierent bipartite complete (t = 2) games with
minimum (r = 1). We also illustrate the diculty to extend similar results for other power
indices.
Proposition 4.1 Let (en;M) be a complete game with en = (n1; n2) andM =  a b, where
a  1 and b  n2   1.
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(1) For a player of type 1 the number of coalitions where he is a swing player is given by
c1 =
n2X
i=b+1

n1   1
a  1



n2
i

+
minfb;n1 agX
i=0

n1   1
a+ i  1



n2
b  i

:
(2) For a player of type 2 the number of coalitions where he is a swing player is given by
c2 =
minfb 1;n1 agX
i=0

n1
a+ i



n2   1
b  i  1

:4
(3) The Shapley-Shubik power index SS1(a; b; n1; n2) of a player of type 1 is given by
1
n!

n2P
i=b+1
 
n1 1
a 1
   n2b   (a+ i  1)!  (n  a  i)!+
(a+ b  1)!  (n  a  b)!
n!

minfb;n1 agP
i=0
 
n1 1
a+i 1
    n2b i:
(4) The Shapley-Shubik power index SS2(a; b; n1; n2) of a player of type 2 is given by
(a+ b  1)!  (n  a  b)!
n!

minfb 1;n1 agX
i=0

n1
a+ i



n2   1
b  i  1

:
(5) For b  1 we have SS2(a; b; n1; n2)  SS2(a; b  1; n1; n2) =
(a+ b  2)!  (n  a  b)!  n1 
 
n1 1
a 1
   n2 1b 1 
n!
> 0:
(6) For a  2 we have SS2(a  1; b; n1; n2)  SS2(a; b; n1; n2) =8<: 0; if b = 0(a+ b  2)!  (n  a  b)!  (n2   1)    n1a 1   n2 2b 1 
n!
; if b  1
Proof.
(1) The vectors representing coalitions where a player of type 1 is a swing player are given
by (a; b + 1), (a; b + 2), : : : , (a; n2) and (a; b), (a + 1; b   1), (a + 2; b   2), : : : , (c; d)
where:
(c; d) =

(a+ b; 0); if a+ b  n1
(n1; a+ b  n1); otherwise.
The number of swings for a player of type 1 for an arbitrary vector (x; y) is:
 
n1 1
x 1
 n2y .
4Unfortunately we cannot apply Vandermonde's identity
kP
j=0
 m
j
  n
k j

=
 m+n
k

directly.
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(2) The vectors representing coalitions where a player of type 2 is a swing player are given
by (a; b), (a+ 1; b  1), (a+ 2; b  2), : : : , (e; f) where:
(e; f) =

(a+ b  1; 1); if a+ b  n1
(n1; a+ b  n1); otherwise.
The number of swings for a player of type 2 for an arbitrary vector (x; y) with y > 0
is:
 
n1
x
   n2 1y 1 .
(3)-(4) These results follow from the denition given in this paper for the Shapley-Shubik
index and parts (1)-(2) respectively.
(5) For n1   a  b  2 we have
SS2(a; b; n1; n2)  SS2(a; b  1; n1; n2) = (a+b 2)!(n a b)!n! 
n1 aP
i=0
 
n1
a+i
 
n2 1
b i 1
 
a+ b  1  (n a b+1)(b i 1)n2 b+i+1

and for n1   a  b  1 we have:
SS2(a; b; n1; n2)  SS2(a; b  1; n1; n2) = (a+b 2)!(n a b)!n! 
(a+ b  1)
b 1P
i=0
 
n1
a+i
 
n2 1
b i 1
   (n  a  b+ 1) b 2P
i=0
 
n1
a+i
 
n2 1
b i 2

;
both of which can be simplied to the stated expression.
(6) Similar to (5).

Corollary 4.2 1. For a given vector (n1; n2) let ((m1;m2)) and ((m
0
1;m
0
2)) be two dier-
ent complete simple games, i.e., 0 < m1;m
0
1  n1 and 0  m2;m02 < n2. If m1  m01
and m2  m02 then SS2(m1;m2)  SS2(m01;m02) and SS1(m1;m2)  SS1(m01;m02),
where equality holds if and only if m2 = m
0
2 = 0.
2. For a given vector (n1; n2):
1
n
< SS1(1; n2   1)  SS1(m1;m2)  SS1(n1; 1) < SS1(c; 0) = 1
n1
(2)
where c is any integer number between 1 and n1.
Inequalities (2) imply
1
n
> SS2(1; n2   1)  SS2(m1;m2)  SS2(n1; 1) > SS2(c; 0) = 0
where c is any integer number between 1 and n1.
17
Remark 4.3 We have implemented a computer program which can determine the Banzhaf
and the Shapley-Shubik power index for bipartite complete games with minimum. For the
case n1 = 3, n2 = 7 we have the following ordering with respect to SS1:
(3;0) = (2;0) = (1;0) > (3;1) > (3; 2) > (2; 1) > (3; 3) >
(2; 2) > (3; 4) > (1; 1) > (2; 3) > (3; 5) > (1; 2) > (2; 4) >
(3; 6) > (1; 3) > (2; 5) > (1; 4) > (2; 6) > (1; 5)> (1;6)
Note that, in general, for an arbitrary pair (n1; n2) the rankings of some games with
respect to SS1 or Bz1 (printed in bold in the previous example) are xed. We refer to the
games of type (c; 0) for c > 0 which are always tied among them and situated on the top
of the ranking and, oppositely, the game (1; n2   1) which is always situated at the bottom
of the ranking. These extreme games are highlighted in black in the previous example for
n1 = 3, n2 = 7. Additionally, Corollary 4.2 provides some constraints on the rankings of
the dierent games with respect to SS1 or Bz1:
1. leaving the rst component xed:
(3; 1) > (3; 2) > (3; 3) > (3; 4) > (3; 5) > (3; 6);
(2; 1) > (2; 2) > (2; 3) > (2; 4) > (2; 5) > (2; 6); and
(1; 1) > (1; 2) > (1; 3) > (1; 4) > (1; 5) > (1; 6):
2. leaving the second component xed:
(3; 1) > (2; 1) > (1; 1); (3; 2) > (2; 2) > (1; 2); (3; 3) > (2; 3) > (1; 3);
(3; 4) > (2; 4) > (1; 4); (3; 5) > (2; 5) > (1; 5) and (3; 6) > (2; 6) > (1; 6).
Taking into account all these restrictions we have that for the given hierarchy n = (3; 7)
we have 13 weighted games, three of which are of type (c; 0) and give the maximum value
1=n1 = 1=3 for the SS1 to three most powerful players; the ranking of all other games with
respect to SS1 is strict so that there are, in principle, 10! potential strict orderings for the
power of SS1 over the set of these games, but Corollary 4.2 guarantees that at most 12 of
these rankings are possible.
4.2 Comparisons for the two Banzhaf indices
As we shall see in this section, we nd for the relative Banzhaf index a similar result to that
one obtained for the Shapley-Shubik index (for less than 100 players), while it fails for the
absolute Banzhaf index.
The relative Banzhaf power index Bz1(a; b; n1; n2) of a player of type 1 is given by
c1
n1  c1 + n2  c2 :
The relative Banzhaf power index Bz2(a; b; n1; n2) of a player of type 2 is given by
c2
n1  c1 + n2  c2 :
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The absolute Banzhaf power index Bz01(a; b; n1; n2) of a player of type 1 is given by
c1
2n 1
:
The absolute Banzhaf power index Bz02(a; b; n1; n2) of a player of type 2 is given by
c2
2n 1
:
Remark 4.4 For the Banzhaf absolute power index, Corollary 4.2 is wrong, and an example
is given by n = 4, n1 = n2 = 2 and the games ((2; 1)), ((1; 1)) with Banzhaf values
 
3
8 ;
1
8

, 
4
8 ;
2
8

, respectively. Another example is given by n = 7, n1 = 3, n2 = 4 and the games
((3; 1)) and ((2; 2)) with absolute Banzhaf indices
 
15
64 ;
1
64

,
 
26
64 ;
10
64

, respectively.
Example 4.5 (Ties) Let us consider the equality case in Corollary 4.2 for the relative
Banzhaf power index, i.e., where the powers sum up to 1. For m2 = m
0
2 = 0 equality holds.
Other examples are given by
 n = 7, n1 = 3, and the games ((3; 3)), ((1; 2)) with Banzhaf numerators (5; 3), (20; 12)
 n = 8, n1 = 2, and the games ((2; 5)), ((1; 4)) with Banzhaf numerators (7; 5), (42; 30)
 n = 9, n1 = 6, and the games ((6; 2)), ((1; 1)) with Banzhaf numerators (4; 2), (12; 6)
 n = 13, n1 = 5, and the games ((5; 7)), ((2; 5)) with Banzhaf numerators (9; 7),
(1044; 812)
 n = 13, n1 = 9, and the games ((6; 2)), ((1; 1)) with Banzhaf numerators (736; 288),
(23; 9)
These are all examples where (m1;m2) > (m
0
1;m
0
2) or (m1;m2) < (m
0
1;m
0
2). If we assume
m1  m01 and m2  m02 then there is no further example for n  32.
Remark 4.6 For the relative Banzhaf power index Corollary 4.2 is true for all n  100.
This suggests to ask whether Corollary 4.2 is true for the relative Banzhaf index for all n.
Conjecture 4.7 (1) For b  1 we have Bz2(a; b; n1; n2) Bz2(a; b  1; n1; n2) > 0:
(2) For a  2 we have Bz2(a   1; b; n1; n2)   Bz2(a; b; n1; n2)  0 which equals zero for
b = 0 and otherwise it is positive.
It would imply a corollary analogous to Corollary 4.2.
Corollary 4.8 1. For a given vector (n1; n2) let ((m1;m2)) and ((m
0
1;m
0
2)) be two dier-
ent complete simple games, i.e., 0 < m1;m
0
1  n1 and 0  m2;m02 < n2. If m1  m01
and m2  m02 then Bz2(m1;m2)  Bz2(m01;m02) and Bz1(m1;m2)  Bz1(m01;m02),
where equality holds if and only if m2 = m
0
2 = 0.
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2. For a given vector (n1; n2):
1
n
< Bz1(1; n2   1)  Bz1(m1;m2)  Bz1(n1; 1) < Bz1(c; 0) = 1
n1
(3)
where c is any integer number between 1 and n1.
Inequalities (3) imply
1
n
> Bz2(1; n2   1)  Bz2(m1;m2)  Bz2(n1; 1) > Bz2(c; 0) = 0
where c is any integer number between 1 and n1.
However, the ranking over dierent games for Shapley-Shubik and relative Banzhaf index
are not necessarily the same, as the following example illustrates.
Example 4.9 For the case n1 = 3, n2 = 7 we have checked the following rankings with
respect to Bz1:
(3; 0) = (2; 0) = (1; 0) > (3; 1) > (2; 1) > (1; 1) > (3; 2) >
(2; 2) > (3; 3) > (1; 2) > (2; 3) > (3; 4) > (1; 3) > (2; 4) >
(3; 5) > (2; 5) > (1; 4) > (3; 6) > (2; 6) > (1; 5) > (1; 6)
This ranking of dierent games with vector en = (3; 7) does not coincide with the ranking
obtained for the SS1 but, restricted to weighted games, it is one of the 12 expected rankings
for the SS1 according to Corollary 4.2.
Remark 4.10 One might conjecture that Corollary 4.2 holds for some eective generalized
power indices as for example semivalues. Semivalues for simple games (or power semi-
indices) are uniquely determined as those power indices that satisfy: symmetry, positivity,
dummy player property and transfer (see [6]) and with specic coecients fpjgnj=1 such thatPn
j=1 pj
 
n 1
j 1

= 1 and pj  0 for all j. The absolute Banzhaf power index is given by
pj = 1=2
n 1 for all 1  j  n and the Shapley-Shubik power index is given by pj = 1
n
 
n 1
j 1
 .
The (unnormalized) power, SV , of player i is given by
SV (i) :=
nX
i=1
pjSj  csi :
where jSj = s.
Let us consider the following example: n = 10, n1 = 7, and the games ((7; 1)) and
((1; 2)) with power index numerators (3p7 + 3p8 + p9; p7), (36p2 + p3; 35p2). This example
is a counterexample to Corollary 4.8 if and only if
207p2p7 + 315p2p8 + 105p2p9   3p3p7 < 0:
If we assume pj = pn j 1 then this is equivalent to
p2  (105p0 + 325p1 + 207p2   3p3) < 0;
and thus it is possible.
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5 Results preserved by duality
This section establishes a simple but signicant result on enumerations and highlights that
the results obtained in the previous section about power indices are preserved by duality.
Let us recall that the dual game of (N;W) is (N;W) where: W = fS  N : N n S =2
Wg. Then it is not dicult to check the following:
Lemma 5.1 (i) (N;W) is weighted if and only if (N;W) is weighted, and if [q;w1; : : : ; wn]
is an integer representation for (N;W) then [T   q + 1;w1; : : : ; wn] is an integer rep-
resentation for (N;W) where T =
nP
i=1
wi and vice versa.
(ii) i % j if and only if i % j where % stands for the desirability relation for game
(N;W). Thus, (N;W) is complete if and only if (N;W) is complete, and the -
classes Ni for (N;W) and its ordering N1 > N2    > Nt are preserved by %, i.e.,
(N;W) and (N;W) have the same ranking en.
(iii) The complete game (N;W) has the vector en = (n1; : : : ; nt) 2 Nt>0 and the matrix
M =
0BBB@
m1;1 m1;2 : : : m1;t
m2;1 m2;2 : : : m2;t
...
...
. . .
...
mr;1 mr;2 : : : mr;t
1CCCA =
0BBB@
em1em2
...emr
1CCCA
as characteristic invariants (hence, fullling properties (1)-(4) in Theorem 2.2) and
matrix
L =
0BBB@
l1;1 l1;2 : : : l1;t
l2;1 l2;2 : : : l2;t
...
...
. . .
...
ls;1 ls;2 : : : ls;t
1CCCA =
0BBBB@
el1el2
...els
1CCCCA
of shift-maximal losing vectors if and only if the complete game (N;W) has vectoren = (n1; : : : ; nt) 2 Nt>0 and matrix
M =
0BBB@
n1   ls;1 n2   ls;2 : : : nt   ls;t
n1   ls 1;1 n2   ls 1;2 : : : nt   ls 1;t
...
...
. . .
...
n1   l1;1 n2   l1;2 : : : nt   l1;t
1CCCA =
0BBBB@
fm1fm2
...fms
1CCCCA
as characteristic invariants (hence, fullling properties (1)-(4) in Theorem 2.2-(a))
and matrix
L =
0BBB@
n1  mr;1 n2  mr;2 : : : nt  mr;t
n1  mr 1;1 n2  mr 1;2 : : : nt  mr 1;t
...
...
. . .
...
n1  m1;1 n2  m1;2 : : : nt  m1;t
1CCCA =
0BBBB@
el1el2
...elr
1CCCCA
of shift-maximal losing vectors.
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Let cg(n; t; r) be the number of complete games with n players, with t equivalence
classes and r shift-maximal losing vectors and similar notation for: cg(n; ; r), wg(n; t; r)
and wg(n; ; r). Lemma 5.1 allows us to deduce the next corollary and describes how the
bijection for characteristic invariants works.
Corollary 5.2 cg(n; t; r) = cg(n; t; r) and wg(n; t; r) = wg(n; t; r).
The application of this Corollary and the results on enumerations in Sections 2 and 3 to
games with one shift-maximal losing vector gives the enumerations for complete games and
for weighted games respectively. An analogous version of Theorem 2.4 is given by
Corollary 5.3 1. cg(n; ; 1) = 2n   1,
2.
cg(n; t; 1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
n; if t = 1 
n+1
2t 1

; if 2  t  n2 + 1
0; otherwise
and an analogous version of Corollary 3.5 is given by
Corollary 5.4
wg(n; ; 1) =
8<: 2
n   1; if n  5
n4   6n3 + 23n2   18n+ 12
12
; if n  6
Due to Proposition 2.7 and Lemma 5.1 it follows that the results in Section 4 for the
Shapley-Shubik index extend to complete games with one-shift maximal losing vector, since
for any given (n1; n2) andM = (a b), the dual game is given by the same vector and matrix
L = (n1   a n2   b) which corresponds to matrix M where:
(i) M = (n1   a+ 1 0) if b = 0, otherwise:
(ii) M =

n1   a+ 1 0
n1   a  b+ 1 n2

if a+ b  1  n1,
(iii) M =

n1   a+ 1 0
0 n  a  b+ 1

if a+ b  1 > n1.
Thus Proposition 4.1 has a simple analogue, and therefore Corollary 4.2 has a simple ana-
logue too. The conjecture stated for the relative Banzhaf index derived for the computation
up to 100 players is also open in this dual context.
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6 Future work
Any progress concerning enumeration of games, like cg(n; t; r) or wg(n; t; r), will be a signif-
icant advance in both directions: either providing new formulas or providing tighter bounds.
In [27] it is proved that cg(n; t; r) is a quasi-polynomial in n, if t and r are given, and can
therefore be automatically computed (without escaping of the problem of capacity limita-
tions). We wonder whether these automatic computations can be performed for the number
wg(n; t; r) of weighted games.
We also encourage research in other classes of simple games. For instance, roughly
weighted games (considered in [44] and extensively studied in [20]) which are complete,
i.e., roughly weighted complete games with n players and t types of equivalent players to
determine rcg(n; t; r).
As a future research concerning section 4 (and 5) it would be nice to nd the proofs
of our conjectures 4.7 and 4.8. It seems likely that these conjectures are true since they
hold for games with less than 100 players. It would also be of interest to know whether the
Shapley-Shubik power index is the unique semiindex (semivalue restricted to simple games)
that satises Corollary 4.2.
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